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BRIEF HIGHLIGHTS 
 
n  Over the past 40 years, the UI 
system has deteriorated in many 
states.
n  Comprehensive UI reform is 
needed because of Congressional 
neglect, policy failures by state 
and federal governments, and U.S. 
economic and demographic changes.
n  Benefits exceeding revenue from 
taxes has left a structural imbalance 
in the overall UI program.
n  There are vast differences across 
states in UI recipiency rates, wage 
replacement rates, and taxable wage 
bases.
n  Benefits should be accessible, 
adequate, well financed, and delivered 
in concert with robust reemployment 
services.
For additional details, see the working 
paper at https://research.upjohn.org/up_
workingpapers/317/.
The federal-state unemployment insurance (UI) program exists to provide temporary 
partial wage replacement to workers who are unemployed through no fault of their own 
while they actively search for work. It is intended to operate as a self-fnancing social 
insurance program with sufcient reserves to pay adequate benefts for reasonable 
durations. However, revenues in several states have eroded over time to the point that 
many have allowed wage replacement rates to fall and others have cut beneft durations. 
Yet, as the average duration of unemployment has increased in the United States, there 
has been a growing need for increasing benefts. 
In this policy brief we describe the structural imbalances in the system and examine 
systemic causes for the deterioration in many states of UI as social insurance. Based on 
our recent review of research evidence we recommend a comprehensive program for UI 
system reform (O’Leary and Wandner 2018). Unlike competing recommendations that 
would tilt the system toward a broader social agenda, our proposal focuses on preserving 
UI’s core role of adequate temporary income replacement for unemployed workers. 
Background 
Tere are four broad categories of factors that suggest the need for comprehensive 
UI reform. First, Congress has neglected the UI program, failing to update and improve 
its legislative framework originally established by the Social Security Act of 1935. Te 
last major reforms of the UI program were over four decades ago, in 1976. By contrast, 
Congress has enacted many changes to the provisions of Social Security, and many 
advisory council reports have resulted in legislative updates and improvements to that 
program. 
Second, the U.S. economy has changed signifcantly since the last UI reform. Te 
industry and occupational mix of employment has shifed, as the goods-producing sector 
has shrunk and service-sector jobs have become more prevalent. Working at smaller, less 
unionized establishments, service workers are less likely to know about the UI system 
and how to apply for benefts, and thus less likely to receive them (O’Leary and Wandner 
2020). Employers also respond diferently to recessions than they did before 1976. 
Layofs are now much more likely to be permanent rather than merely temporary, and 
the duration of unemployment has been increasing. Tese changes have increased the 
likelihood that UI claimants exhaust their benefts before they fnd their next job. 
Tird, the demographics of the U.S. labor force have changed signifcantly. Tere 
have been large increases in female labor force participation, and, since 1990, older 
individuals have steadily become more likely to continue working. Additionally, a greater 
share of households today consist of two or more workers. Moreover, voluntary part-
time employment has become more common, fueled in part by the infux of mothers, 
caregivers, and older workers into the labor force. Despite these shifs, the UI program 
has been slow to accommodate the new demographic reality. 
Fourth, policy decisions and policy failures at the federal and state levels of 
government have substantially weakened the UI program over the past four decades. 
Notably, the leadership and oversight role of the U.S. Department of Labor has weakened, 
leaving the states to determine the scope and nature of their state UI programs (Wandner 
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beneft payments and 
tax contributions have 
been declining since the 
last major UI program 
reforms in 1976. 
2019). Additonally, for many years, state UI laws, programs, and policies have varied but 
generally have reduced beneft payment and tax collection systems. 
A Structural Imbalance 
As a percentage of total payroll, both UI beneft payments and tax contributions 
have been declining since the last major UI program reforms in 1976 (Figure 1). While 
layofs occur throughout the business cycle, many more workers become unemployed 
during recessions. As a result, the number of unemployed workers tends to surge at the 
beginning of a recession and then decline rapidly as the recession ends. To support the 
countercyclical role of the UI system in the macroeconomy, tax contributions should rise 
with business expansion afer a recession trough. However, many states have UI fnancing 
systems that are not responsive to reserve defciencies. In these states, an insufcient 
share of earnings are taxable, employer tax rates are not sufciently responsive to beneft 
changes, and legislatures have sometimes overridden tax increases triggered by low 
reserves. Consequently, in several states the overall fnancing system is out of balance, 
with perpetual defcits putting downward pressure on beneft adequacy. 
Figure 1  Over the Past Four Decades, UI Benefts and Taxes Have Declined as a Share 
of Payroll 
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SOURCE: USDOL (2019). 
Decline in Beneft Generosity 
A rough measure of beneft generosity is the average wage replacement rate: the 
average UI weekly beneft amount divided by the average wage in a UI-covered job. 
Figure 2 shows the steady decline since 1976 in this measure of beneft adequacy. Most 
state UI beneft formulas traditionally aimed to replace about 50 percent of earnings, up 
to a statutory cap. Te decline in the average replacement rate shown in the fgure has 
resulted mainly from most states failing to raise the maximum weekly beneft amount to 
account for wage growth. Some states have also explicitly lowered the wage replacement 
target. Both changes have interfered with the system’s core mission of temporary partial 
wage replacement while workers search for new jobs. 
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Figure 2  The Share of Wages That UI Benefts Replace Has Shrunk over the Past 
Some states provide 40 Years 
adequate benefts and 40% 
collect sufcient taxes to 
pay for them but most do 38% 
not. 
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SOURCE: USDOL (2019). 
Some States are in Worse Shape Than Others 
Te decline in the UI system has been uneven across states. While some states still 
provide adequate benefts and collect sufcient taxes to pay for them, most states do not. 
Many states have also made it more difcult to apply for and be eligible for benefts. A 
summary measure that captures these factors of system adequacy is the recipiency rate— 
the share of unemployed who receive UI benefts. Not all unemployment qualifes for 
UI benefts, so the recipiency rate will never be 100 percent. For example, new entrants 
and reentrants to the labor force do not have sufcient recent work experience to be 
eligible. Workers who voluntarily quit or were dismissed for cause, or who received 
and exhausted their benefts, also lack eligibility. However, these reasons cannot fully 
explain the variation in UI recipiency rates across states summarized in Figure 3. In 18 
Figure 3  UI Recipiency Rates for the Unemployed Vary Dramatically across States 
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UI application procedures 
should not introduce 
unnecessary hurdles to 
eligibility. 
states, fewer than one of fve unemployed workers receives UI benefts. With such low 
recipiency rates, it is hard to recognize UI as social insurance. 
Principles for Reform 
Several authors have recently recommended UI reforms (Von Wachter 2019; West et 
al., 2016), but not all of these recommendations focus on achieving the historical core 
mission of UI. Based on our review of the research, we propose a comprehensive menu 
for fxing the issues we have described here and for restoring UI as social insurance. 
What follows are some of the most important features of our proposal. 
• UI eligibility should be ofered to bona fde labor force members who are 
involuntarily separated from work and actively searching for reemployment. 
Application procedures should not introduce unnecessary hurdles to eligibility. 
• Beneft levels should provide socially adequate income replacement without being 
so high as to discourage reemployment. Beneft durations should be long enough 
to accommodate an energetic and exhaustive search for new work with sufcient 
reemployment assistance. 
• Extended benefts, which automatically extend durations when employment 
conditions are sufciently poor, should cover up to 26 additional weeks in high 
unemployment periods. Additionally, the federal government should fully pay 
for these extended benefts for states that adequately fund 26 weeks of regular UI 
benefts, with the understanding that Congress may act on an emergency basis to 
supplement the permanent EB program. 
• UI fnancing should be ensured by setting the UI taxable wage to a proportion 
of the Social Security taxable wage base, which automatically rises with wage 
growth. Moreover, state UI tax schedules should be fully responsive to employer 
beneft charges; employers with more workers who claim benefts should pay 
proportionately more in taxes. 
• Active work search should be expected of all UI benefciaries, and the public 
employment service should actively support these benefciaries in their search. 
• Special programs should be encouraged. All states should ofer work sharing, in 
which employees get partial UI benefts when their hours are reduced even if they 
are not laid of, and self-employment assistance, in which workers get benefts as 
they try to start a business. Furthermore, states should have the option to ofer 
UI reemployment bonuses for benefciaries who fnd a new job quickly, and to 
experiment with wage insurance, which compensates workers who fnd a new job 
but at a lower wage than their previous job. 
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